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Abstract 
From the Soviet Bloc to the Ballot Box: Democratization in Eastern Europe 
Tyler Swafford 
Dr. Kerem Ozan Kalkan, Department of Government and Economics 
This undergraduate honors thesis examines the common causes of democratic transitions 
in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine. One purpose of this honors project is to discern why 
certain countries like Poland and Latvia have successfully transitioned to and 
consolidated stable democratic institutions, while others like Ukraine have not.  One 
central question examines the degree of influence that foreign actors exerted in promoting 
democracy movements in Eastern Europe. A theoretical framework will be established by 
combining parts of the models of Samuel Huntington, Juan Linz, and Alfred Stepan. The 
research project will place special scrutiny on Huntington’s theory of foreign actors 
affecting democratic change. This thesis will examine how changes in the approach to 
foreign affairs by the Soviet Union, the Vatican, and the U.S. influenced Eastern Europe 
during the “third wave” of democratization. More specifically, these changes will be 
linked to the rise of civil society in the region, like Solidarity in Poland. Other causes and 
aspects of democratic transformation will also be examined, like demographics in Latvia 
and the deep-rooted problems of corruption, economic stagnation, and dependence on 
Russia that continue to plague the Ukrainian democracy. At the end, implications of the 
study will be explored in light of resurgent Russian aggression in Eastern Europe and 
around the world. Questions surrounding the Trump administration and the future of 
transatlantic security and stability will be addressed.  
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Introduction 
  In order to understand the history and imagine the future of democracy, it is vital 
to understand the phenomenon of the “third wave” of democratization in the twentieth 
century in a way that illuminates the factors that led to its occurrence. Three fundamental 
questions guide the study of this period and of global democratization in general. First, it 
is imperative to determine both the independent and common factors that led to the 
democratic transformations in the Eastern Bloc. This study will thus seek to discern the 
common causes of recent democratic transformations in post-communist Europe by 
specifically studying the cases of Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine. Through qualitative and 
quantitative means, various hypotheses and causes of modern democratization will be 
applied to these three cases thematically to more fully comprehend the dynamics of 
democratic transition. By doing so, common causes that initiated democratic opening in 
these three countries will be studied.  
 Second, it is necessary to find out why some countries in this region (such as 
Poland and Latvia) were relatively successful in making the transition to democracy and 
sustaining its institutions, and why others (like Ukraine) faltered after attempting to 
democratize and continue to experience significant problems. These reasons are certainly 
complex, and some are interrelated with the causative factors of democratization. 
However, this question will yield a closer and more in-depth look at each of the three 
countries individually. The mere fact that each country had differing outcomes and 
varying degrees of success demonstrates the truth that, whatever forces led to those 
results, they largely are specific to that nation. Today, Poland and Latvia are established 
members of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European 
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Union (EU), and are two of the fastest growing European economies. Conversely, the 
Ukrainian democracy has been plagued by rigged elections, vast economic stagnation, a 
weak judiciary, and widespread government corruption. Clearly distinguishing the 
reasons for these contrasting results is not only important, but necessary, to comprehend 
the challenges of consolidating a democracy after transition.  
 Third, the role of geographical proximity and foreign influences must be 
scrutinized in relation to a country’s democratic fortunes. This can be understood as the 
“Neighbor Effect,” or the “Domino Effect,” as Dr. Samuel Huntington labels it. 
Numerous political scientists argue that transitions to any regime are mostly due to 
domestic factors that originate from within a country. However, the broader location and 
conditions of the international realm should not be discounted when examining 
democratization, especially in a region like Eastern Europe. The instruments of influence 
and coercion that exist in the arsenal of regional powers and global hegemons enable 
these foreign actors to exert power on other countries and their political processes. These 
foreign actors vary from specific countries to international organizations.  
Inherent in this category of study is pondering the role of the West in supporting 
democracy abroad (and in these three cases) as well as the influence that Russia continues 
to wield over former Soviet satellite states and nations within their “sphere of influence” 
like Ukraine. Influence and power can manifest themselves in economic and diplomatic 
sanctions, humanitarian aid, coalition pressure and pressure from international 
organizations, as well as other incentives. These tools, along with others, comprise what 
is known in the diplomatic community as “soft power.” Coupled with the opposite means 
of influence – hard power or the threat of military force -  these tactics can be incredibly 
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impactful in pressuring a country to change its ways. The role of the “Neighbor Effect,” 
and the foreign policies of the U.S. and Soviet Union, as well as the influence of 
supranational organizations like NATO and the European Community and even other 
sources of power like the Vatican, were at the epicenter of the transition to democracy in 
the Eastern Bloc. Likewise, these foreign factors were equally as powerful in affecting 
the different regime outcomes that existed between each country and continue to exist in 
the present-day. Therefore, this angle of evaluating the past and current state of 
democracy in eastern Europe must not be undervalued. 
Before revealing hypotheses, it is first necessary to explore the background of this 
subject, and lay out the theoretical framework through which this study will partially be 
conducted. The work of certain scholars will be used to examine cases of 
democratization, and will provide various methods for determining the most relevant 
causes of transformation for each country. Huntington, Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz, and 
others all have made substantive contributions to this subject. After laying out the 
theoretical framework, hypotheses will be constructed to guide the study going forward. 
Then, necessary findings, data, and qualitative analysis will be thoroughly disclosed. 
These findings will be amalgamated in the broader international context when possible. 
Finally, after summarizing the study in the conclusion, implications of each transition 
will be explored in order to imagine the future the region. In doing so, present-day 
geopolitical realities will be considered. 
Background 
One hundred years ago to this month, on April 2, 1917, the president of the 
United States had had enough. After years of unilateral aggression by an authoritarian 
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regime in the German empire and dogged American neutrality, President Woodrow 
Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress, asking for war. Yet, the motive of his plea 
did not solely pertain to the interests of his own country. Rather, he believed the destiny 
of the world order was at stake. That world order, the international community that 
Wilson envisioned, was to be grounded in one thing: democracy. He believed the U.S. 
had a responsibility to intervene in the European conflict, the “War to End All Wars,” to, 
in his words: “make the world safe for democracy” (Wilson). With this statement, 
President Wilson not only marked the beginning of a new era in American foreign policy 
thought, but he also advocated for a new international order. 
   Although this was a bold new idea, the foundation of Wilson’s idea for the 
future of the international system had existed for centuries. Democracy is a form of 
government that dates back to ancient Greece. Although present in the works of 
philosophers like Aristotle and Plato, the modern propagation of democracy did not 
emerge until the latter part of the 18th century (Huntington, 5-6). At that point in history, 
democratic revolutions in America and France shocked the western world and 
demonstrated the rising prominence of this new governing model and idea. It took the 
French a few decades to consolidate their democracy and make the full transition, but the 
U.S. and France both quickly became dominant players on the world stage. Nevertheless, 
the spread of democracy was slow. In the ensuing 160 years, only a few states undertook 
democratic transitions - like Switzerland and Great Britain in the 19th century. In the 
immediate aftermath of the second World War, Italy, Austria, Japan, Korea, and West 
Germany accepted various democratic institutions initiated by the Allied occupiers 
(Huntington, 16-19). Turkey and Greece crept toward democracy around the same time, 
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as did many Latin American countries (Huntington, 19). Democracy did not begin to 
significantly spread, however, until the twilight of the Cold War. Specifically, the 
military coup in Portugal in 1974 marked the beginning of what Samuel P. Huntington 
famously labeled the “third wave,” and most dominant period, of global democratic 
transition (Huntington, 4). This broadly refers to the period between 1974 and 1991, but 
especially between 1989 and 1991, wherein approximately thirty countries from around 
the world made the transition from nondemocratic to democratic regimes. This 
constituted the most important movement of the late twentieth century. It prompted 
political scientists and international relations scholars like Francis Fukuyama to 
hypothesize the “end of history,” when democracy would ultimately prove to be the 
universal, predominant, and final form of government. Fukuyama’s exact words from the 
controversial 1989 essay were: “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of 
the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of 
history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government ” 
(Roth & Fukuyama).  Long ago were the days of the surging totalitarianism that led to 
World War II. This new “wave” of democratic transition was a consequential event, 
giving many Western scholars and proponents of freedom much cause for optimism.  
 Although the movement toward democracy in this period spanned geographic 
regions, the area in which it was most concentrated was east-central Europe. After World 
War II, the Soviet Empire bolstered their regional hegemony, spreading their influence in 
most of Eastern Europe. Joseph Stalin and the Soviet regime moved quickly after the 
Allied victory to effectively colonize their western neighbors. After the grueling military 
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campaign that ended in pushing the Nazi’s back to Berlin, the Soviets empowered 
Moscow loyalists within each of their occupied territories to assume political power. 
They infiltrated police forces in countries like Poland and won the propaganda war by 
dominating radio waves in the region (Applebaum). The Soviets also used these occupied 
states for mercantile purposes. They uprooted factories, industries, and even material 
goods, to bring back to the U.S.S.R. to assuage the starvation and economic woes that 
spread across the country during the war (Applebaum). The most notable manifestation 
of Soviet intervention in eastern Europe was the installment of numerous puppet 
communist regimes. Authoritarian governments in Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were, in effect, created and 
propped up by Soviet Russia. The “sphere of influence” that Stalin envisioned when 
discussing Europe’s partition with Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany in the Molotov-
Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of 1939 had taken hold in a most pronounced manner 
(“A secret protocol”). The Soviet Union now dominated half of the continent. Marxist 
teachings of the 19th century, which centered around a revolution by the “bourgeoisie,” 
the political alignment of the working class to communism, and the inevitable domination 
of socialist economics, suddenly appeared to be gaining momentum.  
 The occurrences at the end of the 1980’s represented a stark reversal of Marx’s 
projections. For myriad and complicated reasons, both domestic and international, the 
world’s preeminent communist state weakened and fell. The Berlin Wall, which divided 
up East and West Germany, came down in 1989. The Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-led 
military alliance that existed to counter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
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dissolved in the summer of 1991. Then, finally, the U.S.S.R. communist regime fell just 
after Christmas of the same year. The Cold War was officially over.  
Yet, amid this historic unraveling of a world superpower and its ideology, an 
equally important movement was developing in the Soviet bloc of eastern and central 
Europe. Fourteen countries quickly declared independence from the Soviet Union, and 
pro-democracy movements gained momentum in Poland, Hungary, East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania (Huntington). Remarkably, 
the political landscape of the former Eastern Bloc was upended almost overnight. 
Between 1989 and 1991, every nation in eastern and central Europe held competitive 
parliamentary elections for the first time in decades. Although these elections were not all 
entirely democratic, and some were only partly free, the rapidity and widespread nature 
of this regional political change was shocking and seemingly improbable. In the 
“backyard” of the Soviet Union - one of the two foremost global powers - regime types 
more resembling that of its hegemonic adversary, the United States, expanded at an 
alarming rate. This enabled America to triumph in the all-inclusive confrontation that was 
the Cold War and therefore assume lone ownership of the title: “world superpower.” 
Authoritarianism was in decline, communism was discredited, and democracy was rising.  
Theory  
 Since the late twentieth century, a number of theories have been devised to 
explain this period. Distinct theories have been comprised to evaluate both the 
transitional period to democracy and the consolidation phase in which a nation attempts 
to cement democratic institutions. Before assessing the causes for transition and reasons 
for varied degrees of success in consolidation, qualitative and quantitative methodologies 
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must be outlined. For the purposes of the transitional period, Samuel P. Huntington’s 
theoretical framework outlined in his landmark book: The Third Wave: Democratization 
in the Late Twentieth Century provides a strong basis for examining the movement 
toward democracy in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine. His theory relies on five overarching 
causative factors that are applicable to most cases.  
 First, Huntington cites the declining legitimacy of authoritarian regimes as an 
important cause for democratization. Another term he used for this category was the term 
“performance dilemma” (Huntington, 46). For the “third wave” period, this causative 
factor can be interpreted as not only the declining legitimacy of authoritarianism, but of 
communism specifically. The “performance” aspect of this theory simply refers to the 
ability of the state to “deliver the goods,” or foster economic well-being. In Huntington’s 
words, “Over time … communist governments found it more difficult to invoke 
communist ideology to support their legitimacy. The appeal of the ideology declined as 
the state bureaucracy stagnated and socioeconomic inequalities ossified” (Huntington, 
48). Furthermore, the economic performance of communist regimes in Eastern Europe - 
measured by commonly used categories like unemployment rates, life expectancy rates, 
standards of living, economic growth, and median income levels – created a situation in 
1989 in which “Marxism-Leninism made it impossible to develop legitimacy based on 
their economic performance” (Huntington, 48). As Huntington notes, popular support for 
any regime or government tends to erode over time (Huntington, 48). Yet, in an 
authoritarian regime, once support begins to erode and the economy begins to decline, 
there is no institutional outlet for political resuscitation. In democracies, there is. New 
coalitions and parties rise to power frequently in democratic regimes through a free and 
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fair electoral process. Thus, as eastern Europeans developed frustrations with their 
governments, they slowly developed desires and expectations for regular, competitive 
elections. Additionally, communist regimes lose legitimacy with military failures. 
Huntington cites the lengthy and costly war in Afghanistan as a significant reason for the 
falling popularity of the Soviet Union in the 1980’s (Huntington, 54). 
 Second, Huntington lists economic development as a causative factor for 
democratization; specifically, the growth of global economic output as a means of 
modernizing developing economies. Huntington writes that “economic development, in 
short, provide(s) the basis for democracy” (Huntington, 59). Economic crises also play a 
part. Huntington refers to oil price hikes in some eastern European countries and Marxist-
Leninist constraints in other nations that created economic downturns which weakened 
authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 59). In essence, Huntington (along with most modern 
economists) argues that economic growth and development is interrelated to rising trends 
of urbanization, education, and an expanded middle class (Huntington, 66). These 
economic trends often create social forces and a civil society that possesses the capacity 
to resist authoritarianism and ignite democratic uprisings.  
 Another cause that Huntington cites for democratization in the “third wave” is 
religious changes. This category may not be as universally applicable to East-Central 
Europe as political, economic, and external forces. However, its prevalence and influence 
is still notable, especially in Poland. Western Christianity is strongly and commonly 
associated with democracy, and Huntington notes that, while this correlation does not 
prove causation, “Western Christianity emphasizes … the dignity of the individual and 
the separate spheres of church and state” (Huntington, 73). After all, modern democracies 
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first appeared almost exclusively in Christian countries. As Huntington points out, at the 
time of Third Wave, 57% of predominantly Western Christian countries were democratic, 
while only 12% of non-Christian nations were democracies (Huntington, 73). Therefore, 
it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the expansion of Christianity promotes 
democratic development. The ascension of Pope John Paul II to the head of the Catholic 
Church and the doctrinal changes dictated in Vatican II are vital to examine as it relates 
to the Polish democratic transition. 
 The fourth factor, external forces; the and the fifth hypothesized cause, the 
“Regional Contingency Factor,” or the “Domino theory,” allow for an evaluation of the 
“third wave” with an international scope. Various international factors were instrumental 
in the fates of regimes in Eastern Europe and around the world. The burgeoning question 
that must be addressed, however, is how significant these foreign influences were. There 
is much debate about this in the intellectual community, and of course it is difficult to 
quantify. Yet, understanding the role of global powers in the “third wave” period of 
democratization, as well as how they affected – and continue to affect - the consolidation 
of democracy in the present-day, is essential.  
 The second central question that underpins the study of democratization in these 
three cases – the reasons for varied degrees of success in consolidating and sustaining a 
democracy – can be answered using a combination of theories and data. It is necessary to 
examine this category through both a qualitative and quantitative lens, because the areas 
that illuminate the differing levels of success in a democracy manifest themselves in 
easily comparable numbers and explanatory theories. Among others, the studies of 
German political scientist Wolfgang Merkel are relevant to measuring success in 
Swafford 11 
 
11 
 
consolidation. Merkel’s theories of “embedded democracy” and “partial regimes” can be 
used to understand how Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine all had varying outcomes after their 
respective transitions. Merkel’s concept of “embedded democracy” rests on the claim that 
in order for a democratic electoral system to function properly (when competitive 
elections produce winners that accurately reflect popular preferences and who assume 
power peacefully), then certain behavioral, institutional, and structural elements – called 
“partial regimes” – must be in place (Erisen and Kubicek, 5). Merkel’s four partial 
regimes consist of political participation, civil liberties, mutual constraints on the 
executive and horizontal accountability, and the effective power to govern (Erisen and 
Kubicek, 13). Through examining “micro” and “macro” levels of governance, Merkel’s 
model will allow for the assessment of a broad range of variables in evaluating the 
democratic outcomes in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine after transition. His framework 
provides a theoretically informed means of gauging how an issue within a particular 
partial regime can yield a larger fault line that exists throughout the entire system. (Erisen 
and Kubicek, 4).  
 Additionally, the “consolidation” question will be addressed using data from 
relevant databases like the Freedom House Index, Polity Score, Human Development 
Index, and Gini coefficient. These indexes provide in-depth information regarding 
political, economic, and humanitarian statuses within countries that are necessary to 
compare in the both period of democratic transition and the present-day. Comparing this 
data between each of the three Eastern European countries, and examining their changing 
scores in each category, will provide a clear illustration of the causes that surrounded 
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liberalization. Moreover, it will enable one to understand why there have been varied 
degrees of success in consolidation post-1991.  
 The work of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan in the area of democratic consolidation 
is notable as well, and entirely relevant to apply to this second question. Their definitions 
of how a consolidated democracy operates behaviorally, attitudinally, and 
constitutionally form a benchmark from which the modern states of the Polish, Latvian, 
and Ukrainian systems can be judged (Linz and Stepan, 6). The most pertinent theoretical 
contribution of Linz and Stepan is their “five arenas of a consolidated democracy.” In this 
framework, they outline certain pre-requisites and necessary conditions for the 
sustenance of a democratic regime. First is civil society. This aspect of democratic 
consolidation pervaded most countries during the “third wave,” and these authors 
acknowledged that civil society was “crucial in Eastern Europe as a vehicle for asserting 
the autonomy of those who wanted to act ‘as if they were free,’” (Linz and Stepan, 7). 
The second arena is political society: the development of the “core institutions … by 
which society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government” 
(Linz and Stepan, 8). 
 Third, the rule of law is a commonly accepted trait that must characterize a 
consolidated democracy. As Linz an Stepan note, a state’s claim over the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of force in order to protect citizens and deliver services is required for 
any sustainable democracy (10,11). The aforementioned three “arenas” of consolidation 
outlined by Linz and Stepan are also “pre-requisites” to consolidation. Fourth, there must 
be an effective state bureaucracy to institutionalize democratic procedures. This depends 
on the ability of a state to command, regulate, and extract resources; and provide basic 
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entitlements in its territory amongst its people (Linz and Stepan, 11). Lastly, Linz and 
Stepan claim that “economic society,” or the “set of socio-politically crafted and accepted 
norms, institutions, and regulations…that mediates between state and market,” is another 
supportive condition for a consolidated democracy. (Linz and Stepan, 11). The ability of 
a state to periodically intervene in areas of the market and perform certain functions is 
foundational, even when privatization is the goal. A strong state that has the capacity to 
enact some degree of state regulation is important for a democratic system to consolidate 
and operate in the long term. Linz and Stepan’s framework can be used to examine 
causative factors evident in both the transitional phase and the consolidation phase, 
because oftentimes some of the same causes that ignite a transition can remain relevant in 
consolidation.  
Hypotheses 
Due to the many theories dedicated to this period of resurgent democracy, there 
are a number of opinions regarding the true reasons for the “third wave.” Certainly, this is 
not a black and white area of study. The transitions that began in the late 1980’s 
emanated out of a complicated geopolitical landscape. The causes for each transition 
were complex and multifaceted. Those many causes are not what divides scholars; the 
vast majority of the reasons cited by the intellectual community did in fact exist to some 
degree in Eastern Europe and are not in dispute. The area of ambiguity lies with the 
degree of influence that these causes exerted. Much less consensus is found among 
scholars regarding this issue. Some causes – such as civil society, Soviet reforms, and 
changes in demographics, are widely agreed to be of considerable importance. Yet, the 
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relative impact of other causes – like religion and the influence of foreign actors – are 
debated. 
In light of the research at hand and the implications of this time period, the 
aforementioned causes of democratization will be further examined and affirmed. First, 
certain civilian organizations and forms of peaceful resistance – known as “civil society” 
in the political science field – will be found to be heavily influential, especially in the 
case of Poland. Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy reforms, which angered many hardline 
factions in the Soviet communist apparatus and precipitated the fall of the U.S.S.R., were 
common causes of each transition in Europe. Demographic changes were especially 
important in Latvia. Not only were changes in the population of ethnic Russians and their 
attitudes pertinent to the political transitions in the Baltic states, but implications of these 
changes remained equally as impactful during the consolidation phase as well. The state 
of demographics in Latvia and other Baltic states still undergird questions about the 
future of this region today, especially in light of the recent Russian military intervention 
in Ukraine. 
In addition to asserting the importance of the previously cited causes, this study 
argues that other causes are of equal, if not more, importance to the cases of Poland, 
Latvia, and Ukraine and post-communist Eastern Europe at large. With regard to Poland, 
the role that religion and the Catholic Church played in liberalizing the country and 
pushing back against Soviet authoritarianism must not be understated. Analysis will show 
that the Church, and the values it effectively spread, helped inspire the Solidarity 
movement and lay the groundwork for not only the Polish transition, but the whole 
region’s triumph over communism. The role of geographic proximity and the influence of 
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foreign actors will also be shown to be of colossal importance. Foreign factors are 
sometimes undervalued by scholars, as many tend to focus mainly on the domestic 
conditions of any political transition. But the “Neighbor Effect” and the varying forms of 
power wielded by international hegemons and organizations must not be diminished. This 
cause should occupy as much scrutiny as domestic causes do. After all, most domestic 
causes are interrelated to global or regional dynamics.  
It is important that each country case be examined not with a microscope, but 
with mindfulness of the international environment and the forces therein. If that is done, 
then the linkage between seemingly individual causes, like civil society, demographics, 
and economics, will be connected to broader global movements. This study hypothesizes 
that the de-legitimization of communism in Eastern Europe – triggered by Soviet reforms 
and amplified by the rising influence of the Vatican and United States - emboldened 
dissent and gave way to civil society movements which effectively stood up to 
authoritarians and brought democratic change to the Eastern Bloc. It will also assess 
current geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe in light of resurgent Russian aggression to 
comment on the future stability of democracy in the region. 
Country Background 
 Poland was the first country to transition to a democracy in Eastern Europe. A 
satellite state of the U.S.S.R., Poland had formerly been one of the foremost European 
powers prior to becoming “stateless” from 1795-1918 due to conquest and partition (Linz 
and Stepan, 258). After World War I, Poland was granted independence following the 
Treaty of Versailles. Yet, in 1939, a Nazi-Soviet agreement - the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact - agreeing to divide up Northern and Eastern Europe left the country once again 
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formally dissolved (Kissinger, 272). After World War II, in which Poland was a member 
of the victorious Allied coalition, Polish resistance forces launched an uprising against 
their Soviet occupiers. It was not until this civil war was quelled that the Soviet Union 
established total military dominance over Poland, and the Polish army began to submit to 
the Soviet model (Bielasiak, 271).  
 Latvia, along with her Baltic neighbors Estonia and Lithuania, was independent 
from 1918 to 1940 (Linz and Stepan, 403). There were competitive parliamentary 
elections held in the 1920’s following the expulsion of Soviet troops and recognition of 
Latvian sovereignty, and lands began to be redistributed from wealthy German nobles to 
Latvian farmers. However, just as the country was beginning to recover from the damage 
of the Great Depression, a coup d’etat ushered in the Ulmanis dictatorship in the mid-
1930’s (Linz and Stepan, 403). Parliament was suspended, as were political parties and 
the Constitution. After six years of dictatorship and a centralized economy, Latvia once 
again fell victim to Soviet expansion. The same treaty that preceded the joint invasion of 
Poland, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, laid the foundation for the Soviet invasion 
and annexation of Latvia (Linz and Stepan, 403). Although the Nazis occupied the 
country from 1941 until 1944, the USSR annexed Latvia again after the Allied victory in 
Europe. Nevertheless, as Linz and Stepan note, “Latvia had the most substantial prior 
experience of democratic politics of any of the Soviet republics” (402-403). Constructive 
as that reality may have been, it was still a long road back to democracy. 
 Ukraine, conversely, had virtually no democratic history. Divided between Tsarist 
Russia and Hapsburg Austria prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, Ukraine became the 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) following a bloody war with the 
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Red Army in 1922. The Ukrainian SSR became one of the founding members of the 
Soviet Union, and, later, the United Nations (UN-DPI). In the 1930’s, the USSR cracked 
down on Ukrainian cultural autonomy, installing policies of russification that transformed 
Ukraine’s demographics and led to a massive famine, the “Holomodor” (Famine of 
1932). Nikita Khrushchev was named head of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1938, 
which he led before taking the same position for the entirety of the USSR following 
Stalin’s death in 1953. Like Latvia, Ukraine was occupied by Nazis during World War II. 
Only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 did Ukraine become independent, 
making the transition to a market economy. Yet, due to a number of reasons, many to do 
with continued Russian interference and economic fluctuations, Ukraine has struggled to 
consolidate a democratic regime, suppress corruption, and keep control of its territory. 
Findings 
 It is impossible to observe the regime changes in the third wave without noting 
the strong presence and influence of civil society. In all three country cases, at various 
times, grassroots protest movements emerged to form a popular means of resistance 
against the regime. One of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan’s five pre-conditions for a 
consolidated democracy, civil society also helped initiate transitions in post-communist 
Eastern Europe, especially in Poland. As Linz and Stepan define it: “civil society…(is) 
that arena of the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, 
relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and 
solidarities, and advance their interests” (7). The fact that none of the resistance 
movements in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine were terminally suppressed, such as peaceful 
pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square were around the same time, demonstrates 
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that the regimes lacked the popular support and legitimacy to go against the will of the 
people. 
Civil society and the Catholic Church 
 In Poland, civil society manifested itself in two forms: the Catholic Church and 
“Solidarity”. With its staunch commitment to atheism, the communist apparatus in 
Eastern Europe tried to stamp out any form of religion in the populace. The Roman 
Catholic Church, however, became a central organization through which people in 
Poland could make their voices heard. This represented a contrast to the Orthodox 
Christian Church, which historically represented the national religion and was 
intertwined with the voice of the state (Huntington, 73-76). Roman Catholicism, 
however, became a transnational organization that gave voice to dissidents and opponents 
of repressive regimes (Huntington, 82). The Church was a refuge for people who wanted 
to articulate certain moral beliefs and organize as one to advance their religious values. 
The communist regimes in Poland and elsewhere pushed secularism on a grand scale, and 
sought to undermine the Church at every turn (Linz and Stepan, 245). They intentionally 
attempted to persecute religious groups, infiltrate churches, and ban clergy from positions 
of high status (Linz and Stepan, 245). Yet, in Poland, there was a strong religious culture. 
According to a study conducted by Richard Rose and Christian Haerpfer at the time of 
the Polish democratic transition, 84% of Poles were churchgoers (Rose and Haerpfer). 
 Huntington noted that in the 1950’s, the authoritarian structure of the Catholic 
Church made it a barrier to democratization (77). Changes made in the Church’s doctrine, 
however, turned it into a force for democracy after 1970. The most notable change was 
undoubtedly the convening of the Second Vatican Council, or Vatican II, commissioned 
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by Pope John XXIII in the 1960’s. Held to address relations between the Catholic Church 
and the modern world, Vatican II stressed the importance of social change and political 
accountability (Huntington, 78). Moreover, a recurring theme was the dignity of 
individual rights. One passage discussing the role of the Church asserted that its leaders 
have the onus to “pass moral judgements, even on matters of political order whenever 
basic personal rights make such judgment necessary” (Smith, 284). These doctrinal 
changes outlined the new role of church in society, and prompted many of its leaders and 
followers to oppose communist regimes according their religious values.  
 The ascension of Cardinal Wojtyla, originally from a small town close to Krakow, 
to the pinnacle of the Catholic Church, changed everything. Pope John Paul II became a 
central figure in the Church’s role as a vessel of resistance to authoritarianism. As 
Huntington wrote when discussing the importance of Pope John Paul II to the “third 
wave” of democracy, immediately upon rising to the papacy, he “denounced violations of 
human rights and explicitly identified the Church as the ‘guardian’ of freedom ‘which is 
the condition and basis for the human person’s true dignity’” (Huntington, 83). Human 
rights lay at the center of the Church’s resistance oppressive communist regimes under 
his leadership. The Pope himself asserted the commonalities between his mission and 
democratization while speaking out against Pinochet’s regime in Chile in 1987: “I am not 
the evangelizer of democracy; I am the evangelizer of the Gospel. To the Gospel 
message, of course, belong all the problems of human rights; and if democracy means 
human rights, then it also belongs to the message of the Church.” (Huntington, 84).  Pope 
John Paul II always seemed to be in the right country at the right time - during the middle 
of its struggle towards democracy. Being the first non-Italian pope in over four and a half 
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centuries, and a Polish national who played soccer with Jews and fled the Nazi’s in his 
youth, he had lived out the perils of extreme political power (Stourton, 32). As Pope 
during a consequential time in which the world order was shifting, his pastoral visits had 
profound political effects – both in Europe and South America (Huntington, 83). None 
was more powerful than the first visit to his home country. 
 In 1979, shortly after assuming the papacy, Pope John Paul II visited Poland. This 
was his homecoming visit, and massive crowds lined the streets to hear his words and 
cheer (BBC, 1992). This epic first visit undoubtedly lifted the spirits of the beleaguered 
nation, and planted the seeds for civic and democratic renewal. One Polish bishop 
observed: “(his first visit) altered the mentality of fear…people learned that if they ceased 
to fear the system, then the system was helpless.” (Huntington, 83). British historian 
Timothy Garton Ash remarked that this “first great pilgrimage…was the beginning of the 
end of communism in Eastern Europe. Here, for the first time, we saw that large-
scale…supremely peaceful and self-disciplined manifestation of social unity, the gentle 
crowd against the Party-state, which was both the hallmark and the essential domestic 
catalyst of change in 1989” (Ash, 1990, 17). Ash went on to cite the remarks of Lech 
Walesa, his chief political opponent General Wojciech Jaruzelski, President George 
Bush, and Russian President Gorbachev. Each of these world leaders contributed the fall 
of the Iron Curtain in part to the Pope, leading Ash to conclude: “without the Polish Pope, 
no Solidarity revolution in Poland in 1980; without Solidarity, no dramatic change in 
Soviet policy towards eastern Europe under Gorbachev; without that change, no velvet 
revolutions in 1989” (Ash, 2005). 
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Others also connect the Pope’s effective leadership not only to a revitalization in 
civil society and the role of the Church in society, but to the rise of “Solidarity” and the 
fall of communism itself. One of the preeminent historians of the Cold War, John Lewis 
Gaddis, said that the Pope’s initial trip inspired the formation of “Solidarity” and initiated 
communism’s downfall: “when Pope John Paul II kissed the ground at the Warsaw 
airport he began the process by which Communism in Poland – and ultimately elsewhere 
in Europe – would come to an end” (Gaddis, 193). Indeed, the call of Pope John Paul II 
to abandon fear, pursue freedom, and seek only the goodness and affirmation that comes 
from God inspired a nation, revived a region, and mobilized millions. Imploring the 
citizenry to change their own regimes from within rather than inciting violence, the Pope 
watched as his homeland conquered communism and chose democracy just ten years 
later. 
 After the passionate appeal of the new pontifex and a combination of other 
sociopolitical changes, civil movements spread with great rapidity across Eastern Europe. 
The most famous, of course, was Solidarity. Founded in 1980 by Lech Walesa, Solidarity 
was the first labor union in a Warsaw Pact country not controlled by a communist party 
(Linz and Stepan, 262). It membership quickly rose to over 10 million, which 
encompassed about one-third of the working age population in Poland (Linz and Stepan, 
262). Solidarity was a social platform that pushed for Polish worker’s rights, among other 
societal changes. It was popular, effective, and supported by the Vatican and the U.S., in 
the form of 50 million dollars (Judt, 589). The CIA under the Reagan administration 
provided covert support to Solidarity in the form of money, newspapers and propaganda, 
and organizational advice (Sussman, 128). Their strikes and public demonstrations, and 
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the widespread support of the citizenry it galvanized, made Solidarity a problem for the 
communist regime. Martial law was enacted early in the 1980’s, along with other means 
of suppression, but eventually the regime was forced to the negotiating table with the 
popular union (Linz and Stepan, 264).  
The success of Solidarity was a historic first for the entire Eastern Bloc. Gone 
were the days when the Polish United Worker’s Party (the communist regime), put down 
protests with deadly machine-guns. Gone, too, were the days when full-scale Soviet-led 
invasions brutally extinguished popular movements in other countries, like the Hungarian 
Uprising in 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968 (Linz and Stepan, 237-238). Although 
Solidarity’s peaceful means of civil resistance was initially met with martial law and 
imprisonment, both sides ended up compromising. The Round Table talks were held at 
the end of the 1980’s. Here, the Polish government and Solidarity agreed to conduct 
elections in 1989 – the first (semi) free elections of any country in the communist Eastern 
Bloc. This marked the beginning of the 1989 anti-communist democratic revolutions all 
across East-Central Europe. Poland was the first, and Solidarity was the engine from 
within that made it happen.  
 Although Solidarity was the most notable case of civil society during this time 
period, Poland was not the only country that witnessed popular social movements bring 
about democracy. The “Singing Revolution” in Latvia, as well as the “Orange 
Revolution” in Ukraine, are two other examples. In Latvia, rumors that the Soviet Union 
would build another hydroelectric power plant along its longest river, as well as a metro 
in Riga, further threatened the cultural and environmental landscape of the country. 
Following Gorbachev’s reforms in Moscow which condoned wider economic 
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liberalization in the Soviet satellites, a number of Latvian groups rose up to call for 
independence. The Latvian People’s Front, the Latvian National Independence 
Movement, and the Citizens’ Congress all demanded the restoration of Latvian 
sovereignty and held public demonstrations in the fall of 1988. Approximately one year 
later, a massive “human chain” was formed across all three Baltic countries on the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The People’s Fronts of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania organized an extraordinary demonstration of Baltic unity by forming a 420 
mile-long “Baltic chain of freedom” that ran through the capitals of each country and was 
comprised of over 2 million people (Dreifelds, 34). This was a symbolic call for unity 
and independence from the Soviet Union. Less than seven months later, new elections to 
the “Supreme Soviet” (the legislative bodies) were held. In May, after continued social 
resistance and Soviet decline, Latvia finally declared its independence in 1991. 
 The Orange Revolution restored hope in Ukrainian democracy in 2004. The run-
off vote for the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election was tainted by corruption and voter 
fraud. Results were thought to be rigged by government authorities in favor of Viktor 
Yanukovych over his opponent, Viktor Yushchenko (Aslund and McFaul). Kiev became 
the rallying point for pro-democracy protests and acts of civil disobedience, strikes, and 
sit-ins. In November, over half a million people convened at Kiev’s Independence Square 
wearing orange, the color of Yushchenko’s campaign, and marched peacefully around 
Verkhovna Rada, the parliament building (Karatnycky). The democratic revolution led to 
the Supreme Court’s announcement that the election results would be nullified, and a 
second run-off was freely and fairly conducted. This resulted in a clear victory for the 
challenger, Yushchenko, and he was sworn in as president in 2005. Ukraine’s democracy 
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has ebbed and flowed since then, and still struggles with entrenched problems of 
corruption that were not adequately addressed by the Orange movement (Fukuyama, 
547). Yet, the Orange Revolution shows that Ukrainians have the capacity to demand 
democracy in a peaceful and convincing manner. This movement, as well as the powerful 
forms of social uprisings in Latvia and Poland before their respective democratic 
transitions, demonstrate the accuracy of Linz and Stepan’s theory that an active civil 
society – which is autonomous from the state - is one of the absolute necessary conditions 
for democracy. Without the coordinated organization of a populace that is persistent in 
petitioning oppressive regimes and demanding political change, authoritarianism will 
linger. Today, Poland and Latvia are both free and prosperous largely due to the efforts of 
civil society.  
Demographics in Latvia 
 In addition to the popular protest movements like the “Baltic Chain of Freedom,” 
Latvia also benefited from the surprising ability of its Russian minority population to 
integrate into Latvian society. The issue of the ethnic Russian minority population was at 
the heart of their transition to democracy in 1991, and remained a barrier to democratic 
consolidation going forward. Latvia had, and still has, the largest population of Russians 
among any of the three Baltic states (over one-third of the population at the time of 
transition), and, therefore, their ability to assimilate was an important determinant of 
whether Latvia could make a smooth transition (Linz and Stepan, 410-412). Furthermore, 
democratic consolidation will continue to be most difficult in Latvia, because it is the 
most demographically diverse of any Baltic state (Linz and Stepan, 405). As data shows, 
Russian minorities felt a strong identification with Latvia and a relatively weak 
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identification with the U.S.S.R. during the “third wave” period (Linz and Stepan, 410). 
Over half of Russian speakers in Latvia more closely identified with the Latvian state in 
1992, which was up 20% from just two years earlier (Linz and Stepan, 411). Moreover, 
according to a survey conducted at the time, approximately 85% of non-Latvians felt 
“proud” or “very proud” of being a resident of Latvia in 1990 (Klingemann and Titma). 
As Linz and Stepan put it, this demonstrated the ability of the Russian minority in Latvia 
to have “multiple and complementary identities” and assimilate culturally and politically 
(Linz and Stepan, 410). The perceived acceptance of this ethnic “other” by the Latvian 
Popular Front and other nationalist factions aided their quest for democracy. The whole 
population – comprised of ethnic Balts and ethnic Russians – largely joined together in 
protesting communist occupation and united under the cause of independence. As Soviet 
influence fell, Balts and Russians grew stronger in their support of democracy, and in 
1991, it came to be. 
 Yet, upon finally making the transition to a democracy, the Latvian government 
undertook measures to exclude ethnic Russians from certain freedoms (Linz and Stepan, 
409). The newly minted Latvian Popular Front regime restricted citizenship and voting 
rights only to pre-1940 citizens and their descendants, thus depriving hundreds of 
thousands of Latvian-born Russian speakers these fundamental rights (Linz and Stepan, 
414-424). The government also adopted native language policies (Linz and Stepan, 413). 
This stark reversal in tone and policy by the new regime towards its Russian minority, 
which was mimicked in neighboring Estonia, hampered the quality of Latvian democracy 
in the years following independence. These politics of subtraction damaged the 
credibility of the Latvian democratic system, and hurt the relations of ethnic Balts with 
Swafford 26 
 
26 
 
Russian minorities (Linz and Stepan, 420). Progress has been made since the mid-1990’s, 
and today over half of the Russian minority have gained citizenship. However, many still 
retain alien status. Although the Latvian government and economy have developed well 
in recent decades, the future health of their democratic system will in part depend on their 
ability to be inclusive.  
Problems with consolidation 
 Although Poland is often lauded as the shining success story of democratization in 
the Eastern Bloc, its transition did not come without complications. After the Round 
Table Talks were held at the end of the 1980’s, in which both sides (Solidarity and the 
communist regime) agreed to conduct elections in 1989, Solidarity dominated in the new 
political system (Huntington, 23). The labor union-turned-political party won 99 out of 
the 100 seats in the newly formed Senate, and 161 of the open seats in the lower house, 
the Sejm (Linz and Stepan, 267-269). Lech Walesa himself won the presidency in 1990 
and served as president for 5 years (Huntington, 23-24; Steger, 114). However, since 
Poland was the first country in the region to democratize, there were faults in the 
negotiating process that led to what Linz and Stepan call a “pacted transition” (Linz and 
Stepan, 264). Solidarity made certain concessions that hampered the movement towards a 
full-blown democracy. For example, 65% of the Sejm would continue to be appointed in 
non-competitive elections, and thus a non-democratic house of Parliament was deeply 
involved in drafting the new democratic Constitution (Linz and Stepan, 267). The first 
president, who under the new Constitution was awarded special powers in national 
security, defense, and international affairs (along with emergency powers), was (for the 
first year) the old communist head of state, the authoritarian General Wojciech Jaruzelski 
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(Linz and Stepan, 268). These reserved remnants of power made it more difficult for 
Solidarity to fully accelerate the process of democratization. As is seen so often in 
numerous cases of democratic transition around the world, mistakes that allow remnants 
of the old autocracy to retain a “seat at the table” in the new government can have 
lingering consequences.  
 While Poland, Latvia, and other Eastern Bloc countries certainly experienced 
growing pains in the primitive years of their new democratic regimes, it is still important 
to recognize that these transitions, when examined in whole, were largely successful. 
Today, Poland and Latvia are thriving countries with relatively strong liberal 
democracies. Poland is one of the safest and most visited countries in the world, and 
maintains a “very high” score in the Human Development Index, ranking among the top 
in the Western world (Linz and Stepan, 269). Latvia, in addition to Poland, is one of 
Europe’s fastest growing economies. Both nations are well-established members of both 
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), joining in 
the early 2000’s. Conversely, Ukraine continues to suffer from economic stagnation, 
corruption, and dependence on Russia. Unlike successful Western democracies elsewhere 
in central Europe, Ukraine is a prime example of a country that has not consolidated 
democratic institutions successfully post-transition.  
Ukraine 
 Ukraine, like all other satellite states, finally claimed independence after the fall 
of the Soviet Union, but due to deep-rooted problems that continue to undermine the 
country’s sovereignty, its democratic transition continues to be a work in progress at best. 
Economic crisis and stagnation has struck the Ukrainian state multiple times after its 
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transition. The first crisis occurred immediately after the shift toward a market economy 
in 1991, which ignited an eight-year recession (“Macroeconomic indicators”). After a 
period of rapid growth in the early-2000’s, the economy shrank 15% in 2009, with 16% 
inflation. GDP fell a staggering 20% from spring 2008 to spring 2009 (Inozmi). 
Additionally, after the Russian invasion in 2014, annexation of Crimea, and resulting war 
in the East, the economy was reduced to zero GDP growth (“Amid staggering 
destruction”). Ukraine’s economy is only now beginning to recover from that recent 
catastrophe.  
 A multitude of Ukraine’s economic problems are interrelated to government 
corruption and Russian military and economic dominance over the state. Corruption is 
the single largest hindrance to democratic consolidation in Ukraine. It costs the state 
budget billions annually, Ernst and Young once ranked Ukraine among the three most 
corrupt nations in the world back in 2012, and Western diplomats have referred to the 
regime as a kleptocracy (Kyiv Post). The executive branch is overreaching and non-
transparent - reaping the rewards of clientelism. Ukrainians also have a weak civil society 
footprint. The justice system is especially compromised, and represents a complete 
failure in democratic integrity. Only about 10% of the population trusts the judicial 
system, and judges are vulnerable to pressure from political and business interests as 
bribes oftentimes exceed their salaries (Hanouz and Geiger).   
 Ukraine’s proximity to and dependence on the Russian Federation continues to 
stall democratic consolidation in the country. About 40% of Ukraine’s total energy 
consumption is dependent on imports from Russian producer Gazprom, who claims that 
Ukraine owes billions in debt (Chorvath). With no real short-term energy solutions 
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outside of Russian imports, Ukrainian economic sovereignty looks bleak for the future. 
Russian is able to leverage its economic superiority over Ukraine to exert its military and 
geopolitical might – as witnessed by the Crimea annexation in 2014. In 2013, then-
President Viktor Yanukovych, who was the initial beneficiary of voter fraud in the 2004 
election, mysteriously suspended the installment of an association agreement with the 
EU. This led to mass protests by the so-called “Euromaidan” supporters, who eventually 
succeeded in ousting Yanukovych (Balmforth). He then fled to Russia in exile, where he 
remains today. These events gave way to the invasion in 2014 and ensuing conflict in the 
eastern region of Donbas, where Yanukovych’s support was largely concentrated. The 
striking turn of events showed the continued struggle of Ukraine to move out of Russia’s 
sphere of influence and integrate into Europe.  
Graphical data 
 It is important to observe, through visual graphs and data, how democracy has 
developed in Poland, Latvia, and Ukraine - and how its quality coincides with certain 
economic and living conditions. The Polity Score project, which measures various 
aspects of regime status and levels of executive authority, depicts a clear difference in 
Polish and Ukrainian authority trends post-transition 
(http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm): 
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
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As Figures 1 and 2 both show, Poland had a remarkable jump right after its transition, 
while the fluctuating Ukrainian graph indicates the continued instability of its economy 
and government. 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a widely respected database that 
compiles a composite statistic of life expectancy, education, and financial status in order 
to measure a person’s progress in quality of life over time (“Human Development 
Reports”):  
Figure 3 
Human Development Index (HDI) changes over time: Poland, Latvia, Ukraine 
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Figure 3 shows that Poland’s HDI levels have historically increased with the 
consolidation of democratic institutions, while Ukraine’s levels have ebbed and flowed in 
conjunction with economic crises. 
GDP per capita, measured in Figure 4, is a commonly used metric that is also 
taken from the Human Development Index. It measures income levels and closely 
mirrors HDI levels in each country (“Human Development Reports”): 
Figure 4 
GDP per capita (2011 PPP $): Poland, Latvia, Ukraine 
 
It should be noted that, although not displayed graphically, data trends compiled from the 
Gini coefficient also closely resemble that from HDI levels and GDP per capita. The Gini 
coefficient is another economic metric that evaluates inequality levels. Levels of 
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inequality directly and unsurprisingly coincided with the progression of democracy in 
Poland and Latvia, and, just like HDI and GDP per capita, they have floundered in 
Ukraine. Another noteworthy observation from both Figures 3 and 4 is the downturn in 
Ukraine’s numbers (consistent in both graphs) around the year 2014, the time of the 
Russian invasion. This data shows how Russian expansion directly impacted Ukraine’s 
economy and living standards. 
The final graph, Figure 5, shows data collected from the Freedom House Index, 
which conducts research to measure levels of political freedoms and human rights around 
the world. Figure 5 reveals the quality of civil liberties in each of the three countries over 
the past two decades (“Freedom in the world”). 
Figure 5
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It is not a surprise that certain freedoms have suffered in Ukraine as its political system 
has floundered in corruption. Freedom of the press, which is another category measured 
by Freedom House over time, has tumbled ten points during the last decade in Ukraine 
(https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/ukraine). The underperformance of 
Ukraine in civil liberties demonstrates the accuracy of Wolfgang Merkel’s concept of 
“embedded democracy” and “partial regimes” in that the protection of civil liberties are a 
necessity for a stable, functioning, and quality democracy.  
Foreign actors 
While causes like civil society, multiculturalism, and economic conditions were 
integral in the democratic transitions during the “third wave” in Eastern Europe, the 
impact of foreign actors cannot be underestimated. As Huntington wrote, “By the late 
1980’s, the major sources of power and influence in the world – the Vatican, the 
European Community, the U.S., and the Soviet Union – were all actively promoting 
liberalization and democratization” (Huntington, 86). It is Huntington’s fifth “causative 
factor” that is often overlooked, yet was incredibly important, to igniting democratization 
in the late twentieth century. The biggest cause of any was undoubtedly the fall of the 
Soviet Union and declining legitimacy of communism and authoritarianism in the Eastern 
Bloc. The reforms of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980’s were the single 
largest contributor to this consequential, historic decline of a world superpower. 
Moreover, the ensuing democratic transitions of 15 states in the Soviet Bloc were a direct 
result of changes in Soviet foreign policy initiated by Gorbachev’s government 
(Huntington, 98-99).  
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Upon ascending to the presidency, Mikhail Gorbachev revoked the Brezhnev 
Doctrine – a hallmark of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War (Huntington, 99). 
Devised by former General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, this doctrine was grounded in the 
reality that the Soviet Union would intervene whenever necessary to maintain existing 
communist dictatorships, especially within its sphere of influence. This was the 
foundational idea, or the unwritten rule, upon which brutal military interventions were 
enacted in the Cold War. Instead of doubling down on regional domination and military 
threats, Gorbachev reversed course and pursued an agenda of economic liberalization, 
political restructuring (perestroika), and openness to the West (glastnost). These famous 
reforms angered many hardline factions within the Soviet communist party, but they were 
necessary to save the country from economic calamity resulting from a military spending 
bout with the U.S (Kissinger, 310-311). This total reversal of decades of Soviet foreign 
policy doubtless gave way to all the other causes attributed to democratization in this 
period.  
Protests and disastrous economic conditions had been prevalent in Eastern Europe 
for decades, but they were always suppressed or disguised by the hegemon in the region. 
The Hungarian Uprising in 1956, the Prague Spring in 1968, as well as interventions in 
Poland in the 70’s, are all examples of how the U.S.S.R. used its military might to 
unilaterally protect dictatorships within its sphere of influence and impose rule and 
ideology (Linz and Stepan, 237-238; Huntington, 118). Yet, Gorbachev worked directly 
to de-legitimize and unseat old-guard authoritarian leaders in East Germany, Bulgaria, 
and Czechoslovakia, and encouraged Communist Party leaders in Poland to join in a new 
governing coalition led by Solidarity (Huntington, 99). By removing the threat of military 
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force and embracing reforms like glastnost and perestroika, Moscow thus became not 
just an enabler of, but a force for democracy. In Third Wave, Huntington boldly wrote 
that Gorbachev joined John Paul II, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan as “the major 
transnational promoters of democratic change” in the late twentieth century (Huntington, 
100). Although it is not clear that Gorbachev had the same intentions as the other three 
individuals cited, his actions directly resulted in full-scale democratization and the total 
decline of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. In that vein, Huntington’s assertion 
becomes sensible.  
 The role of the United States in this period cannot be underestimated either. 
Although not as consequential as the Soviet Union, the U.S. definitely helped accelerate 
democracy in Eastern Europe by changing its approach to foreign affairs. A few years 
before Gorbachev came to power and initiated the Soviet reforms, the U.S. became an 
active player in supporting democracy efforts around the world. With the end of the 
Nixon and Ford administrations also came the conclusion of an era of Henry Kissinger’s 
realpolitik foreign policy. Whereas Secretary Kissinger geared U.S. foreign relations to 
focus vigorously on American interests and downplay the need to meddle in the domestic 
affairs of other nations, President Carter vowed to put human rights on the “world 
agenda” in his 1976 campaign (Huntington, 92). This promise came after certain 
congressional initiatives amended foreign assistance treaties to make it possible for the 
president to deny foreign aid to authoritarian regimes guilty of gross human rights 
violations (Huntington, 91). Carter did indeed make human rights more of an emphasis 
by the American government as he helped upgrade the American bureaucracy to give 
human rights programs more organizational clout (Huntington, 92). 
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 When President Ronald Reagan came into office, he built on the Carter 
administration’s focus on human rights, but in a different way. Whereas Carter focused 
on specific humanitarian abuses, the Reagan administration sought to target the 
governments that enabled abuses and oppression to occur (Huntington, 92). Therefore, in 
the 1980’s, it was the ideological foe of communism and authoritarianism that drove the 
Reagan foreign policy. In this period, the National Endowment for Democracy was 
created, the U.S. applied economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures to oppressive 
regimes, and also gave heavy financial and tactical support to pro-democracy forces 
around the world (Huntington, 93-94). This included millions of dollars sent to support 
Solidarity in Poland by the CIA (Huntington, 94). President Reagan and British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher, who were close allies and both fervently anti-communists, 
engaged Gorbachev personally - forming an open dialogue manifested in many 
conferences that precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union. One example was the 
Reykjavik talks in 1986, in which Reagan proposed the elimination of all nuclear delivery 
systems and boldly walked away after his Russian counterpart refused (Kissinger, 313). 
President George H.W. Bush also used skilled personal diplomacy during his 
term, which directly coincided with the democratic transitions in the Eastern Bloc. 
President Bush resisted the urge to celebrate the fall of the Berlin Wall or excessively 
relish in America’s triumph in the Cold War – which simultaneously meant Soviet 
embarrassment at the fall of their empire (Kissinger, 315; Meacham, 400-401). With this 
measured diplomacy, his administration helped soften the blow of the end of the Cold 
War to the dissolving Soviet Union. This made it safer for democracies in the Eastern 
Bloc to re-create their sovereignty and normalize their national identity – evidenced by 
Swafford 38 
 
38 
 
the reunification of Germany (Meacham, 400-402). In effect, Presidents Carter, Bush - 
but especially Reagan - helped put democracy and human rights on the world’s 
conscience, and at the epicenter of international affairs (Huntington, 94-95). No longer 
were these “Western values” placed at the periphery of American foreign policy, but in 
the 1980’s they became a central focus. This in turn sided the U.S. (along with the 
Vatican) with resistance groups fighting communism’s oppressions, and emboldened 
freedom fighters to generate change. 
 European institutions were likewise influential in supporting democracy 
movements. Although not as impactful as the Soviet Union, the U.S., or the Vatican, the 
European Community began what became known as the Helsinki Process (Huntington, 
89-90). Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which have since morphed 
into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), drafted documents 
that offered support for Western values (Huntington, 89-90; Kissinger, 309). Conferences 
in Belgrade, Vienna, and Madrid prompted communist governments to endorse Western 
values, and thus opened them up to international criticism when they violated their treaty 
commitments (Huntington, 90). This pressure and oversight conducted by the West was 
largely symbolic, but it still aided the perception of democracy in Eastern Europe and 
contributed to the falling legitimacy of the Soviet Union.  
Summary and Conclusions 
 After careful examination of the numerous causes related to “third wave” 
democratization, and after considering them in light of relevant theory, it is clear that the 
most defining cause of democratic transition in this period was the impact of Soviet 
reforms and the chain reaction they set in motion. The pivot of the U.S.S.R. toward the 
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West and newfound support of economic openness and political restructuring, combined 
with the removal of the Brezhnev doctrine, led to the collapse of Soviet regional 
influence and the reputation of communism, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism in 
general. Moreover, this shift in foreign policy and evaporation of power directly gave 
way to a revitalized civil society and emboldened dissent in the Eastern Bloc. This is how 
groups like Solidarity and the “Baltic Way” gained their autonomy from the state and 
effectively organized to voice their opposition to the existing governments in the region. 
Combined with other causes like economic stagnation, these movements and domestic 
forces in each satellite state eventually succeeded in bringing democratic change. It is in 
this fusion of both Huntington’s hypothesis of the impact of foreign influence and Linz 
and Stepan’s theory regarding civil society as a necessary pre-condition for democratic 
consolidation that the overarching cause of democratization in this era is found.  
 Having validated the central impact of Soviet reforms, it is still important not to 
lose sight of the roles that the Vatican, the U.S., and, to a lesser degree, the European 
Community occupied in this process. Through foundational shifts in both America’s and 
the Vatican’s approach to foreign affairs, democratization in East-Central Europe was 
undoubtedly hastened. America’s power and the influence of President Reagan and Pope 
John Paul II must not be downplayed when observing this era. By embracing their roles 
as world leaders and championing democracy and human rights, the rise of American and 
Catholic influence collided at just the right time to bring about the ideological defeat of 
communism. 
 Barriers to consolidation still exist in Poland, Latvia, Ukraine, and many other 
democracies in Europe. The “pacted transition” in Poland, or the “curse of the first,” 
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which left the country with reserved domains of power, understandably complicated the 
Polish transition for a time (Linz and Stepan, 264). In Latvia, exclusive policies adopted 
by the government post-independence damaged relations with a significant minority 
population (Linz and Stepan, 414-420). Going forward, the Latvian state must reconcile 
the idea of a “nation-state” with a multicultural, liberal democracy. In Ukraine - which 
still struggles with democratic consolidation – corruption, economic crisis, and 
dependence on Russia continue to stand between a kleptocratic state and a healthy 
democracy with full protection of civil liberties. Economic growth and political 
sovereignty will not occur until the Ukrainian state fully claims independence from its 
hegemonic neighbor.  
Implications 
 Examining the implications of certain present-day geopolitical realities, in light of 
this historical study, is imperative to imagine the future of democratic stability in Eastern 
Europe. Today, Russia is no longer receding from the world stage, or withdrawing its 
influence and power. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia continues to attempt to re-create that 
Soviet-style sphere of influence and has conducted a worldwide assault on democracy 
and human rights. This is evident by the unilateral invasion into Ukraine in 2014, 
continued tactical support for separatist militias in Eastern Ukraine, crimes committed in 
the Syrian civil war and complicit support of a war criminal in Bashar al-Assad, and the 
meddling in U.S. and European elections. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was a land-
grab and a violation of international law the likes of which Europe had not witnessed 
since Hitler’s expansion in the 1930’s. Putin appears to define Russian foreign policy 
success as anything that comes at the expense of democracy, the U.S., or Western 
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unification. All of this begs the question: how safe are democracies like Latvia and 
Ukraine today, and what will the West do about this resurgent Russian aggression? 
 Possible Russian expansion into the Baltic region is no notion of fantasy. In 1995, 
Boris Yeltsin’s foreign minister remarked at the UN that the use of Russian force in 
Estonia or Latvia would be justified to defend the rights of the Russian minority in the 
two Baltic nations (“Meri Dismayed”). Today, Russia is clearly more aggressive and 
likely to expand under Putin. When annexing Crimea, one of the reasons that Putin cited 
at the time was the need to bring ethnic Russians back into the “motherland,” which was 
essentially the same reason Hitler gave for annexing Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other 
territories in the 1930’s (Conant). According to the CIA World Factbook, the percentage 
of Russian minorities in Ukraine in 2014, at the time of invasion, was 17.3 percent 
(Conant). Today, Latvia has the highest percentage of ethnic Russians of any European 
country, at 26.2 percent (Conant). This is only another incentive for the Latvian 
government to adopt inclusive policies towards its Russian minority – not only for their 
democracy, but for their security and stability.  
 In these uncertain times of tension, strong American moral leadership need not be 
in question. This is because, as it was in the 1980’s, American engagement is once again 
critical to restraining Russia and supporting democracies in Eastern Europe and around 
the world. American commitment to NATO, the continued stability of the EU, and 
Western support of democracy and human rights will arguably help determine the fate of 
certain vulnerable nations in Eastern Europe. In the 2016 campaign, then-candidate 
Donald Trump, when asked about what he would do as president if a NATO ally in the 
Baltic region was attacked by Russia, was noncommittal on his support of collective 
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defense – obligatory under Article V of the NATO treaty (Fisher). President Trump’s 
concerns over defense spending with underpaying NATO allies are justified, and 
certainly not new. Even still, America must be committed to the military alliance. As this 
study revealed, the stability of democracies in Eastern Europe and the success of pro-
democracy dissent movements at least partly depend on American support, even if it is 
largely rhetorical. In a new era of Russian aggression, this support is as important as ever. 
If American allies in the region are to feel safe from this real threat, the U.S., along with 
the liberal West, must once again establish itself as that “shining city on a hill” – a 
beacon of freedom for all to see.  
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